How Donald Trump implemented the Gaza ceasefire agreement

How Donald Trump implemented the Gaza ceasefire agreement

Steve Witkoff was just a spectator at the U.S. Capitol when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress in July, an experience the real estate investor described as “epic” and “spiritual.”

Five months later, the Bronx-born businessman – with no experience in diplomacy – was in Israel as Donald Trump’s chosen Middle East envoy, urging Netanyahu to make concessions to end the devastating 15-month war in Gaza.

After grueling conversations, countless false premonitions and seemingly endless problems, the odds seemed to be against a breakthrough before the end of Joe Biden’s term as US President.

It was significant, therefore, that Witkoff was present along with the other mediators when Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani finally declared in Doha that Israel and Hamas had agreed to a ceasefire that would include the release of the hostages held in the besieged Strip made possible.

“What has changed in the last eight months? It was Trump and Witkoff. “The way Trump went about it really showed the difference,” said one person briefed on the talks.

Prime Minister Netanyahu during his meeting with Steve Witkoff
It is not known whether Steve Witkoff (right) made specific threats from Trump or made promises to Benjamin Netanyahu in the event of a deal © Government of Israel/Prime Minister’s Media Advisor

The structure of the deal – a multi-stage proposal that ultimately leads to peace and reconstruction – was first conceived by mediators and publicly endorsed by Biden more than six months ago. But it was Trump’s imprimatur that ultimately sealed the deal.

Trump had made Middle East peace a big issue during the campaign and attacked Biden’s failure to reach a ceasefire; After the vote, he quickly backed up his rhetoric. Witkoff, who was unexpectedly appointed Middle East envoy, was deployed to Qatar on November 22 – less than three weeks after his election victory.

In Doha, Witkoff met with Sheikh Mohammed to get an update on the status of the stalled talks and to understand why Qatar – which has been criticized by the warring parties for its lack of progress in the talks and the criticism it has received over its inclusion of Hamas withdrew, was frustrated – had stopped his role as a mediator.

He then flew to Tel Aviv to meet Netanyahu. It is not known whether Witkoff made specific threats to Trump or made promises to Israel in the event of a deal – both hallmarks of Trump diplomacy, which is equally unpredictable and transactional.

But the effect was clear: a day later, on November 24th, Israel’s top negotiator David Barnea, head of the Mossad secret service, traveled to Vienna to meet with Sheikh Mohammed.

“That’s when it started, and Israel’s preparedness was completely different,” said the person briefed on the talks.

Witkoff, a close friend of Trump who is also known to Qatari officials through his real estate business, had suddenly become the weathermaker on an unusual negotiating team led by Biden’s top Middle East adviser Brett McGurk.

By directing their envoys to coordinate, Biden and Trump temporarily put aside their fierce personal and political rivalry – a minor miracle in itself.

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Their challenge was clear. Netanyahu spent much of last year bypassing Biden’s mediators, coming close to an agreement several times before introducing new conditions, such as new demands including that Israeli troops remain in the Philadelphia Corridor, a piece of territory that runs along the Gaza Strip. Egyptian border.

Even some Israeli security officials accused Netanyahu of blocking the process, but the Biden administration, at least publicly, largely agreed with Israel and blamed Hamas for the collapse of the talks.

By this point, Israel had largely achieved its battle objectives against Hamas: the militant group’s military capacity had been shaken and Israel had assassinated virtually all of the group’s top leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of the October 7 attack.

Biden’s team had long concluded that there would be no deal as long as Sinwar was alive. But even after Israel assassinated him in October, the Gaza talks were still stalled. Netanyahu publicly insisted he would never agree to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza or withdraw Israeli troops from the besieged strip – and there was no sign he would back down.

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Trump’s election victory shook up the Gaza talks and created a new reality: any deal agreed to by Biden would be implemented by Trump.

In early December, Trump made it clear that he wanted to end the conflict by the time he took office in January, posting on his Truth Social platform: “If the hostages are not released before January 20, 2025…” . . There will be hell to pay in the Middle East.” The post came shortly after Trump had dinner with Netanyahu’s wife Sara and son Yair at his Mar-a-Lago club.

In mid-December, Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan and McGurk traveled to Israel in a final push to revive talks on a ceasefire in Gaza against hostages.

There was a suspicion that Netanyahu was waiting to hand Trump a victory, not the lame-duck Biden presidency. The Israeli prime minister also faced constant pressure from far-right allies who threatened to leave his ruling coalition if he agreed to a deal with Hamas or “surrendered” to the Palestinians – a factor he continued to deal with after the deal was announced had to fight.

But people briefed on the talks said Witkoff was unwilling at several points to stall the discussions. With Trump’s support, he told Netanyahu directly what needed to happen and offered assurances of strong U.S. support for Israel, the people said.

“He gives us much authority to speak in his name, and he exhorts us to speak with authority. And emphatically means, ‘Do better,'” Witkoff told reporters in Palm Beach last week.

People walk past posters depicting hostages kidnapped during Hamas' deadly attack on October 7, 2023
The first hostages were scheduled to be released on Sunday, a day before Trump’s inauguration on January 20 © Ammar Awad/Reuters

McGurk returned to the region in early January, shortly after Hamas made a key concession: it agreed to a list of about 34 hostages to be released in the first phase of the deal, a senior U.S. government official said.

But once again the momentum of the talks waned. Witkoff flew back to Doha late last week to meet Sheikh Mohammed to discuss the delays and agreed that Witkoff would pressure the Israelis while Qatar would pressure Hamas.

With McGurk’s approval, Witkoff then traveled back to Israel to meet Netanyahu – an unscheduled trip on Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest.

Witkoff next joined McGurk and Barnea, Israel’s top negotiator, in Doha, where they remained until the deal was finalized. The conversations took place in Sheikh Mohammed’s office or residence and often lasted late into the night.

At times, Hamas negotiators were present in the same building, just one floor below.

Many in the Arab world and beyond believed Biden had repeatedly failed to use his influence over Netanyahu to agree to a deal or contain Israel’s fierce offensive in Gaza while standing steadfastly on the side of the Jewish state.

When Witkoff intervened, the Israelis appeared more compliant. “He approached it as if he was trying to close a deal,” said the person briefed on the conversations. “He put the right pressure on. You get the feeling that when he met the Israelis there was progress.”

People celebrate along a street in Khan Yunis
Thousands of Gazans celebrate on a street in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip as news of a ceasefire spreads © Bashar Taleb/AFP/Getty Images

At first, McGurk and Witkoff were in contact and informed each other. But in the final stages of the talks, they came to the conclusion that it would make sense for Witkoff to participate directly in the negotiations.

They knew that any breakthrough would depend on Netanyahu accepting critical issues that had previously derailed a deal, such as where Israeli forces would be redeployed in Gaza.

Here Witkoff played his role, supported by Trump’s political influence. Netanyahu was aware that Trump had pushed through a series of pro-Israel measures during his first term in office that upended years of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

“The only difference is Trump. Netanyahu wants to join Trump. . . “They (the Americans) have made it clear that they want peace here,” said another person familiar with the talks.

Trump’s election victory also led Qatar and Egypt to put new pressure on Hamas.

“The Trump effect affected not only Bibi, but also Qatar and Egypt,” said Dennis Ross, a former Middle East peace negotiator now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “They leaned on Hamas because they both have an interest in showing Trump, ‘Look what we did’.”

The ceasefire is now scheduled to come into force on Sunday, when the first hostages are due to be released – a day before Trump’s inauguration on January 20th.

Additional reporting by Neri Zilber in Tel Aviv

Cartography by Aditi Bhandari

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