Warriors Film Summary: About Jonathan Kuminga and Andrew Wiggins holding the Rockets down and forcing them into submission

Warriors Film Summary: About Jonathan Kuminga and Andrew Wiggins holding the Rockets down and forcing them into submission

A quick look at Jonathan Kuminga’s effectiveness as a pick-and-roll ballhandler paints a picture of someone who isn’t all that effective in the pick-and-roll, according to Synergy. Before the game against the Houston Rockets, Kuminga scored 85 possessions in pick-and-roll situations with the ball in his hands – a low number that highlights his role in the offense and the overall pecking order. Of those 85 possessions, the Golden State Warriors scored a total of 66 points, regardless of whether Kuminga scored himself or someone else was involved in the action that ended the play (e.g. the rollman or a third party). That equates to 0.776 points per possession (PPP), which isn’t a great number.

However, if you were to watch Kuminga on a few possession plays where he was tasked with scoring and creating in the pick-and-roll against the Rockets, without the above context, you wouldn’t view him as a mediocre pick-and-roll player consider -roll operator. Without Steph Curry to create scoring opportunities and without Draymond Green to provide the connection between start and finish, Kuminga was thrust into the starting lineup to shoulder that burden and share it with Andrew Wiggins. Both could score given the right context and situations, but their shared weakness of flipping coins limits their ability to be true scorers and creators.

In a way, Steve Kerr flipped several coins tonight by trusting that Kuminga and Wiggins would dominate the ball. He also helped them simplify their readings and decisions while trying to hide their aforementioned weakness. It wasn’t perfect – in particular, Wiggins was at risk of being stripped during drives on multiple occasions, something that has also plagued Kuminga throughout his career – an instance where he exposed the ball too often without possessing the skill to either to go around the stripes or commit a foul. But the heads outnumbered the tails, enough for Kuminga and Wiggins to make a difference, helping the Warriors to a 15th straight victory over the Rockets.

Kuminga in particular showed maturity and poise well beyond his 22 years, something that was expected of him in his four years in the NBA. Perhaps he was given a role that he felt he deserved: as a scorer and primary ball player. Kuminga made it clear that this was semi-normal, even if Curry was there. He made many important arguments in his favor tonight, but none was more important than a crucial play after the timeout where Kerr was able to get Kuminga the ball and get the smaller Fred VanVleet to switch to Kuminga and force him to take one Drive to defend.

According to Kerr after the game, this was the plan he had in mind:

Kerr’s mention of “ghost screens” was an attempt to exploit the Rockets’ switch-everything system. A simple error in executing these switches would have left a player open while cutting toward the rim; At the very least, it would allow Kuminga to make the move he wants to VanVleet, which comes after Wiggins’ second ghost screen. Notice how Dillon Brooks – trying to prevent Wiggins from sliding to the rim after the screen to overcome the switch – drops back ever so slightly, which helps Kuminga gain the angle with his drive to the rim against VanVleet:

Another example of Kuminga’s patience and skill in the pick-and-roll was this possession:

No contact was made on the screen, but in the case above none was necessary. Aaron Holiday opted for a throw from Kevon Looney as Kuminga had sunk a couple of three-pointers against defenders going under the screen. The traditional mindset for defense would be to stay the course and go by the scouting report when it tells you to go under against a certain player, no matter how well he shot. But Holiday makes this choice with previous shots in mind, making Kuminga’s attack against Steven Adams easier (aided by patience and finishing chops).

Although Kuminga has taken his shots against “under” coverage for the Rockets, his history as a pull-up shooter justifies this coverage choice in most cases. Defenders ducking under screens give Kuminga more options than just settling for jumpers – he can drive out of the small window, giving him an angle from which to burst through the lane and challenge the big players, or put his defender in a compromising defensive position that he cannot manage. I don’t allow them to properly stop his lane departures:

Wiggins, on the other hand, has been a more effective pick-and-roll operator this season due to Synergy tracking: On slightly fewer possessions (71), the Warriors have scored 1.085 PPP, with Wiggins being the pick-and-roll ballhandler before the game against the Rockets. While Wiggins can start as a ball handler with possession and get a ball screen straight up, Kerr had to help Wiggins a little schematically to get him moving, give him momentum downhill and let him get to the point B without the ball anywhere the way from point A:

Otherwise, it was a matter of whether Wiggins was able to keep the ball during his drives or turn it over due to turnovers or loss of control. If he managed to get close to the edge with the ball still in his hand, it was a matter of finishing the ball:

Without Curry drawing attention while handling the ball, it was up to Kuminga and Wiggins to break down the defense and make sound decisions with the ball in their hands. By and large, Wiggins chose to score. But when the opportunity presented itself, Wiggins was able to pass the ball to the open man.

The attention he draws down low while driving leaves Moses Moody open – but not before Moody stays in the paint for a hit to the back screen in “Spain” or “Stack” pick-and-roll action relocate:

As for Kuminga, the patience he displayed as he read through the defense and made his decision based on what the defenders were throwing at him made a noticeable difference:

A fact that also applied to Wiggins on this possession – supported by Kuminga’s attack on open spaces created by Wiggins’ advantage creation:

Measured in terms of points per 100 possessions, the Warriors were unspectacular offensively (103.1 offensive rating). But on offense they had Kuminga (33 points – a career high – on 62.5% from 2-pointers, 50% from 3-pointers, 66.7% from free throws and 67% TS) and Wiggins (23 points from 45.5% from shots). ) get two-pointers, 75% three-pointers, 57.1% free throws and 63.6% TS) were just enough to get one Complementing the defensive performance that won them over, they limited the Rockets to 95.9 points per 100 possessions in a low-possession grindfest where Kuminga and Wiggins wore the Rockets down with their one-two punch of controlled aggression.

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